Sanitized Co	opy Approved	for Release 2010/11	/10 : CIA-RDP	88G00186R0010		
			c		DD/A Registr 85-2229/	
•		ROUTING AND	RECORD S	HEET		
UBJECT: (Optional)	Response Director	to D/ISOO's Lette of Central Intel	er Regarding Ligence Dire	Classification (DCIDs)	on of	
Deputy D	Fitzwater irector for dquarters	Administration	EXTENSION NO.	OIS 85-352	: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	S
O: (Officer designation ulding)	n, room number, en	d DATE	MITIALS I I	MMENTS (Number eac whom. Draw a line ac	n comment to show fross column after each	om whom comment.)
1. EXDIR	7	A JUL 196:	7	DO A RE		
2					10-7	
3. DDCI		5 JUL 196	35		:	
4.						
5. DCI		Sply JUL &	For	Signature.		
000		00			:	
7.						
9.					:	
0.	and the second					
11.				60-7	in on puter	
2.				(		
3.						
4.					DCI	
5.					DCI EXEC REG	)
			1			

.

						I	D/A Regi 85 - 222	Stry		!
†. ·					<del>oviet</del>	B AND	RECOR	D SHEET		
BJEC	CT: (Opt	!	Response	to of	D/ISOO' Central	s Lette Intell	r Regard igence D	ing Class	ification of (DCIDs)	
OM:			Informa		O		ECTENSION	MO. OIS	85-352	S
			uilding	ICZOH	Servic	RB/I		DATE	<b>28</b> JUN 1985	ST
): (C liding	Officer des	ignation, re	iom number, (		D/ NECEIVED	ATE PORWARDED	OFFICER'S	COMMENTS to whom. I	(Number each comment to show the show the shown after each column after each	rom whom comment.
•	EO/D	)A			1 J	L 1985	881			;
<u>.</u>										
•	ADDA				1	TVL TVL	9			· i ·
									<ul><li>4</li><li>4</li><li>5</li><li>6</li><li>7</li></ul>	ı
•	DDA				2 4	<u> </u>	0		†	
•		*		:						
•										
•										
•		: :	•							
•		:								
•					·					
•										!

85-22291

2 JUL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater

Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Response to the Director, Information

Security Oversight Office (D/ISOO) on

Classification of DCI Directives

REFERENCE: Letter to DCI fm D/ISOO, dtd 24 Jun 85,

Re Classification of DCI Directives

- l. Attached for your signature is a letter to Mr. Steven Garfinkel, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, concerning questions he has raised on the classification of Director of Central Intelligence Directives 1/7, 1/17, and 1/19.
- 2. The letter clarifies several points that Mr. Garfinkel perceived to be deficiencies in the way these DCIDs are classified and marked. It also agrees to carry out one of the marking changes he suggested. The letter has been coordinated with the DCI Security Committee and the Executive Secretary, NFIB.

3. It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to Mr. Garfinkel.  $\label{eq:mr.def}$ 

Harry E. Filtzwater

STAT

Attachment

i c c a c i i i i c i i c

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10 : CIA-RDP88G00186R001001290011-1

EXECUTIVE SECRETABLES

### ROUTING SLIP

):		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL			
L	I DCI		¥					
12	DDCI		X		<del>                                     </del>			
3	EXDIR		X	·				
	D/IC\$		X					
_ 5	DDI			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
6	DDA	X						
7	DDO							
8	DDS&T							
9	Chm/NIC							
10	GC							
11	IG							
12	Compt							
13	D/OLL							
14	D/PAO							
15	VC/NIC							
4	D/01S/DA		X	<del></del>				
17	D/Sctv		X					
18	D/Scty EXEC SEC	NETR	X					
19				<del></del>				
20								
21				<del></del>				
22				<del></del>				
	SUSPENSE 1 July 1985							

Remarks To # 6: Please have response prepared for DCI signature; coordinate with all concerned.

3637 (10-81)

STAT

General Services Administration Information Security Oversight

Office

Washington, DC 20405

LOGGED

**Executive Registry** 85-2483

June 13, 1985

2 4 JUN 1985

Honorable William J. Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20250

Dear Mr. Casey:

It has come to the attention of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) that several Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) that were formerly unclassified and widely available may have been improperly classified. Harold Mason, a member of my staff, recently reviewed the DCIDs in question (1/7, 1/17 and 1/19) and initially noted that they were not portion marked as required under Executive Order 12356. An agency head may grant a waiver from portion marking, but the Director of ISOO must be notified of this decision. Mr. Mason was informed that a waiver had been granted and DCIDs need not be portion marked. However, prior to its inquiry ISOO had not been advised of this decision.

Mr. Mason was also informed that the formerly unclassified DCIDs were classified because of an order to classify all DCIDs at the Section 1.6(c) of the Executive Order and Section 2001.6 of ISOO Implementing Directive No. 1 establish requirements and criteria that must be met before information that has been disclosed may be reclassified or classified in the first While many of these requirements were not met, Mr. Mason is satisfied that revised DCIDs 1/17 and 1/19 meet the criteria for classification under the Order because of changes from the previously unclassified versions. However, does not, in ISOO's view, meet the criteria for classification following its prior disclosure in an unclassified format.

I am further concerned because the reclassified DCIDs contain the statement, "Any senior official in the intelligence community can release portions of the document." This statement raises the strong possibility of inconsistent treatment of like information, a situation that undermines the credibility of the classification system.

(13)

2

Mr. Mason has been informed by CIA officials that they are prepared to resolve these issues satisfactorily. I would very much appreciate your assistance and a subsequent response on these matters.

Sincerely,

STEVEN GARFINKEL

Director

# NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD WASHINGTON D.C. 20505

1 September 198B

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF DCI DIRECTIVE SERIES

SUBJECTE Control and Classification of DCI Directive Series

- 1. Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 12356, all Director of Central Intelligence Directives will be controlled as SECRET, unless otherwise specified.
- 2. Requests for exceptions to this stipulation should be forwarded to the Executive Secretary, NFIB/NFIC, for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Chairman



U"U",13 1 1 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

Ols Registry 83-634/2

25X1

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 OCT 1982

Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information Security
Oversight Office (Z)
General Services Administration
18th & F Streets, N.W.
Washington, DC 20405

Dear Mr. Garfinkel:

Pursuant to Executive Order 12356, Section 1.5(b), we are forwarding a copy of the portion marking waivers granted by the Director of Central Intelligence for 11 classes of Agency documents.

Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from enclosure.

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10 : CIA-RDP88G00186R001001290011-1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DDA 82-1862

General Counsel 82-07775

2 3 AUG 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Executive Director

FROM:

Harry E. Fitzwater

Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT:

Portion Marking Waivers

1. Action Requested: Waiver of the portion marking requirement for specified classes of documents.

#### 2. Background:

- a. Executive Order 12356 and its implementing directive, which became effective on 1 August 1982, continue the requirement that each classified document be marked to indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are not classified. Waivers to this requirement may be granted by the head of an agency upon a written determination that there will be limited circulation of the specified documents and limited potential usage of these documents as a source for derivative classification determinations or there is some other basis to determine that the potential benefits of portion marking are clearly outweighed by the increased administrative burdens.
- b. Agency components have submitted requests for the 11 classes of documents listed in the attachment.
- 3. Recommendation: We recommend you waive the portion marking requirement for the classes of documents listed in the attachment.

Harry E. Firzwater

Attachment: As stated

UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment





C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-I.

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PORTION MARKING WAIVERS

1.	The President's Daily Brief (PDB)
	outside the Agency
	This publication is read/only by the President, the Secretary of State
the	e Secretary of Defense, and the President's Assistant for National
Sec	curity Affairs. Many diverse sources are used to compose the contents,
oft	ten under extreme deadline pressure late at night. The few recipients
hav	re no need to be informed of the separate classifications, if any, of
CON	mponent parts. The classification of material in the PDB is not used

25**X**1

### 2. SCI Material Generated by SCI Contractors in Contractor Facilities

The majority of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material generated by SCI contractors in contractor facilities is of a technical or engineering nature and is an end product. Therefore, it is unlikely that this material would be used as a basis for classification of other documents. The requirement to portion mark these documents would significantly increase the manhours required to produce them. This increase in contract costs would greatly exceed any benefits derived from portion marking.

### 3. Headquarters-Field Correspondence

as the basis for classifying other documents.

Headquarters-field correspondence is largely an informal administrative and operational information exchange. Individual documents are generally brief and by direction concern one subject. Portions (paragraphs) are often cryptic, and therefore meaningful only in context. Furthermore, most of this correspondence must be classified because of the locations to or from which it is addressed, and is difficult to identify portions that do not reveal, either directly or by implication, the locations involved. This correspondence receives limited dissemination outside the Agency and is seldom the basis for derivative classification of other documents.

25X1

All Portions Unclassified Except as Marked

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

### 4. Formal CIA Budget Documents

Formal CIA Budget documents prepared for internal and external review have a very limited distribution. Internal documents are distributed to Executive Committee members. Externally, distribution is limited to those officers in the Intelligence Community Staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congressional Staffs who handle the CIA account. Budget documents are not used as a source for derivative classification. Given the fact that Budgets are lengthy, produced under extremely short deadlines and go through various drafts, galleys, and page proofs, the potential benefits of portion marking are clearly outweighed by the administrative burdens.

## 5. Office of Inspector General Inspection, Audit and Grievance Reports and Special Studies

Inspection, audit and grievance reports and special studies produced by the Office of Inspector General treat both highly sensitive and relatively innocuous activities in a manner that renders the interrelationship of these activities inseparable. Therefore, separate paragraph classification is, for the most part, impossible. These documents have very limited dissemination and are rarely, if ever, used for derivative classification. Additionally as to grievance reports, the principal means of confirming the sensitivity of information provided by an employee is to consult with the employee's supervisor or office, which consultation would violate the absolute confidentiality that is at the heart of the IG grievance process.

## 6. Speeches Prepared by the Public Affairs Division for Use by the DCI, DDCI and Executive Director

The Public Affairs Division is routinely tasked with writing speeches for the DCI, DDCI, Executive Director and occasionally other Agency principals. Although the speeches are generally unclassified, on occasion classified speeches are prepared. These speeches usually are prepared under tight deadlines and are drawn from a wide variety of classified material. Due to the short deadlines involved and the vast scope of the subjects covered, portion marking would severely limit the ability to produce these speeches in a timely manner. In addition, the speeches are not disseminated beyond the recipient for whom they are prepared and are not used as a basis to classify other documents.

### 7. Foreign Intelligence Information Reports (DO Raw Intelligence Reports)

Foreign Intelligence Information Reports provide original data collected in response to the expressed needs of the Intelligence Community. Each report is on a single subject and normally from a single source. Because of the inseparability of the information from the sensitivity of its method of collection, these reports are classified as whole documents and disseminated on a need-to-know basis. Individual reports may be limited to a very few individuals or may be disseminated to all parts of the Intelligence Community.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

### 8. National Intelligence Council (NIC) Estimative Publications

The estimative publications produced by the NIC include National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIMs) and National Intelligence Council Memoranda (NICMs). With the exception of NICMs, the publications are coordinated, interagency products that go through an elaborate production process involving multiple contributors and many revisions. All four publications tend to be lengthy papers, frequently involving scores if not hundreds of paragraphs that are based on a synthesis of material from many sources. They contain as well the considered intelligence judgments or analysis of many intelligence officers throughout the Intelligence Community. Portion marking could therefore be misleading; paragraphs would bear a classification either reflecting only the source material but not the significance of the conclusion drawn or, conversely, reflecting the judgment but implying that the source material dictated the classification. Also, the repeated addition and revision of estimative material makes it very difficult to portion mark.

All NIC publications are disseminated to named addressees within policymaking and intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government. NIEs, SNIEs, and IIMs tend to have a total distribution of several hundred copies each, while NICMs are usually sent to a more restricted list of addressees. These publications rarely should form the basis for classifying other documents.

#### 9. ADP Data Bases and Computer-Generated Reports

Computerized data bases contain data that range from Unclassified through Top Secret. The resources and cost required to portion mark each data item and to program the computers to automatically classify computer-generated reports based on the highest classification of the data items displayed would be substantial. Also, many data bases include data items that when processed or reported together may require a higher level of classification than any individual item. It is not possible to economically identify and program all such relationships so that computer-generated reports using such data will be properly classified.

Computer reports generally are only disseminated within the Agency and used for administrative and research purposes.

#### 10. Periodic Activity Reports

Periodic activity reports are generated by components at all levels of the Agency to inform the next higher level of management about current activities. These reports are not disseminated outside the Agency and are not used as a basis for classifying other documents.

### 11. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Directives

DCI Directives provide guidance and instruction to members of the Intelligence Community on all aspects of the national foreign intelligence program. The use of these documents as a source for derivative classification is limited primarily to the implementing instructions. The directives are currently disseminated to about 1,000 addressees in the Intelligence Community, but this number will be greatly reduced in the near future.